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CHINESE PATENT LAW’S STATUTORY DAMAGES
PROVISION: THE ONE SIZE THAT FITS NONE

Xiaowu Li & Don Wang
Abstract:
The concept of statutory damages was first introduced into the
Chinese patent regime in 2001 as a “last-resort” approach for damages calculation in
infringement cases. Curiously, in the following 15 years, this last-resort approach
became so popular among the courts that it is essentially the exclusive approach today.
This Article examines the legal and policy implications of the current statutory damages
scheme, and concludes that the existence of statutory damages is fundamentally
detrimental to the validity of the Chinese patent system. Therefore, we argue that the
statutory damages provision in Article 65 of the Patent Law of China should be
eliminated. This Article further provides a comparative law perspective, drawing lessons
from U.S. copyright law, U.S. patent law, and German patent law, to illustrate that
China’s patent system would be better off without this statutory damages provision.

INTRODUCTION
Let us imagine that you invented the most efficient solar panel known
to mankind. With this new panel, human society would not need to worry
about its need for energy for the next millennium. Like many inventors
before you, you patented the solar panel and built a whole business based
upon it with great success. All of a sudden, other companies started to copy
your technology without obtaining a license, stealing millions of dollars of
business away from you. Naturally, you took the infringers to court. After
an exhausting litigation, which cost you $400,000 in attorney fees, the court
finally entered a decision in your favor, with a statutory damages award of
—$40,000! Out of shock and disbelief, you decided to spend more money
to appeal the decision. A couple months later, the appellate court rejected
your appeal and told you that the damages award, as low as it was, was
within the statutory range authorized by the law. There was simply nothing
the appellate court could do for you because the district court acted well
within its discretion. At the end of the day, you start to question: what was
the point of obtaining a patent to begin with? It provided some symbolic
protection, but you still lost a lot financially. As absurd as this whole story
sounds, this is the reality many patent owners in China face under the
Chinese patent law’s current statutory damages provision. 1

1

Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju Fujuzhang Hezhimin Daibiao: Baohu Zhishi Chanquan Xu Qianghua
Xingzheng Zhifa (国家知识产权局副局长何志敏代表：保护知识产权需强化行政执法) [The Deputy
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This Article examines the legal and policy implications of the
statutory damages provision within Article 65 of the Chinese Patent Law,
and argues that the policy makers in China should eliminate it in its
entirety.2 Part I of this Article describes the overall problem of inadequate
compensation in China’s patent regime. Part II provides an overview of the
damages calculation regime in Chinese patent law and the origin of its
statutory damages provision, presents evidence for the proposition that
statutory damages are the major driving force for the low compensation
problem, and examines the reasons why statutory damages are so prevalent.
Part III illustrates that the current statutory damages provision in Chinese
patent law is built on shaky legal ground, and is fundamentally detrimental
to the entire patent system. Part IV compares the statutory provisions in
Chinese patent law to that of U.S. copyright law, and concludes that any
attempt to reform the Chinese statutory provisions would be counterproductive. Part V provides a comparative law perspective based on U.S.
and German patent laws to demonstrate how China can build a robust
damages calculation scheme without the statutory damages provision.
I.

THE INADEQUATE COMPENSATION PROBLEM OF THE PATENT REGIME IN
CHINA

Over the past three decades, China has significantly improved its
patent protection regime. 3 However, low damages awards in patent
infringement cases are still subject to continuing criticism from legal
scholars and industry players in the Chinese market. 4 According to data
Director of SIPO: We Need to Strengthen Administrative Agency Enforcement to Protect Intellectual
Property],
CHINA
DAILY,
Mar.
4,
2016,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/microreading/interface_toutiao/2016-03-04/14586302.html. (noting the damages award in patent cases are
consistently low, and that one factory in Zhejiang Province spent RMB 400,000 in litigating the case, but
only received RMB 40,000 in damages award).
2
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [Patent Law of People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective
Apr. 1, 1985, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1,
2009), art. 65, translated in STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C.,
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t20110119_566244.html
[hereinafter
Chinese
Patent Law of 2008].
3
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know: Revealing the New China’s Intellectual
Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS. U.L.J. 773, 774 (2011) (noting that the empirical data and translations of
Chinese court decisions revealed that the Chinese society has become very protective of intellectual
property rights); Chris Neumeyer, China’s Great Leap Forward in Patents, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/04/04/chinas-great-leap-forward-in-patents/id=38625/.
4
See e.g., Yieyie Yang, A Patent Problem: Can Chinese Courts Compare With the U.S. in
Providing Patent Holders with Adequate Monetary Damages, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 140,
142 (2014); Nagendra Setty & Alex Chachkes, International Patent Litigation: A Case Study Approach,
2014 WL 788286, at *6 (2014); Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes:
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compiled by CIELA, one of the most cited Chinese intellectual property
analysis services, the average damages awarded in patent infringement cases
in China from 2006 to 2013 a mere RMB 118,266.00 (approximately
$18,253.00). 5 This is only 35% of the average damages claimed by the
patentees.6 One judge from Guangdong People’s High Court commented
that the damages awarded in intellectual property cases are generally less
than 5% of the actual losses suffered by plaintiffs.7 This turns out to be very
problematic. On one hand, there is little incentive for infringers to
proactively avoid infringement given the “easy profits” one can make
through infringement as compared to the low damages he or she has to pay if
found infringing.8 On the other, the low damages award, as compared to the
litigation costs, renders it uneconomical for patentees to enforce patent rights
in courts.9 Consequently, the current patent protection regime in China has
been regularly criticized as “ineffective.” 10

Intellectual Property Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 100-01 (2012); Rachel T. Wu,
Awaking the Sleeping Dragon: The Evolving Chinese Patent Law and its Implications for Pharmaceutical
Patents, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 549, 562–63 (2011); Cheng Miao et al., Theory and Practice Related to
Patent
Infringement
Damages,
4
CHINA PAT.
& TRADEMARK
12,
20
(2009)
http://www.cpt.cn/uploadfiles/20100414095525062.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, REPORT ON
PATENT
ENFORCEMENT
IN
CHINA,
(2012)
[hereinafter
USPTO
Report],
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/China_Report_on_Patent_Enforcement_(FullRprt)FINAL.pdf.
5
Analysing Patent Civil Infringement Cases, CIELA, http://www.ciela.cn/en/analysis/patents
[hereinafter CIELA REPORT] (register/login; follow “ANALYSE CASES” hyperlink; then follow “Civil
Infringements” hyperlink; then follow “Generate Report” hyperlink).
6
Id.
7
Yangcheng Evening News (羊城晚报), Zhishi Chanquan An Weihe Peichang Nan (知识产权案
为 何 赔 偿 难 ) [Why it is Difficult to Reach Fair Compensations in Intellectual Property Cases],
NEWS.163.COM (Apr. 23, 2015), http://news.163.com/15/0423/14/ANT3OVHT00014AED.html.
8
Campbell & Pecht, supra note 4, at 101; see also Kristina Sepetys & Alan Cox, Intellectual
Property Rights Protection in China: Litigation, Economic Damages, and Case Strategies, in ECONOMIC
APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY, LITIGATION AND M ANAGEMENT 11.401, 11.406
(Gregory
K.
Leonard
&
Lauren
J.
Stiroh
eds.,
2005),
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/PUB_IPR_Protection_China_IP1138.pdf
(noting that a proper level of damages awards can deter infringers and the traditionally low damages
awards in patent infringement cases in China are hurting the country’s ability to effectively enforce patent
rights).
9
See Wanshan Zhuanli Qinquan Sunhai Peichang Zhidu Haixu Shichang Jizhi Peihe (完善专利侵
权损害赔偿制度还需市场机制配合) [The Improvement of Patent Infringement Compensation Regime
Requires
the
Assistance
of
Market
Mechanisms],
WTOIP
(Jan.
26,
2015),
http://www.wtoip.com/news/a/20150126/8367.html (noting that patentees in China regularly face the
dilemma of “losing money to win a patent case”); Wei Zhang, Zhishi Chanquan Qinquan Huo Peier
Zhengti Piandi (知识产权侵权获赔额整体偏低) [The Overall Compensation for Intellectual Property
Infringement is Too Low], SUPREME COURT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, (Apr. 18, 2013),
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2013/04/id/948907.shtml.
10
Campbell & Pecht, supra note 4, at 101.
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Notably, the policy makers in China explicitly acknowledge that the
current low compensation level is a systematic problem of China’s patent
regime.11 For example, in early 2015, the Supreme People’s Court of China
submitted a report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress detailing its review of patent law enforcement.12 In the report, the
Court specifically identified low damages awards as one of the key problems
in the current patent regime, and the Court made several pointed
recommendations of corrective measures.13 In the official commentary to
the proposed Fourth Amendment to the China’s Patent Law, the State
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) similarly lists “low compensations” as
one of the five major challenges in patent enforcement.14 Accordingly, there
is a tremendous consensus among the stakeholders of China’s patent system
that inadequate compensation for patent infringement hinders China’s patent
regime from further development, and there is an urgent need for
comprehensive solutions to this problem.
II.

THE STATUTORY DAMAGES SCHEME
UNDER-COMPENSATION PROBLEM

AS THE

DRIVING FORCE

OF THE

There are several theories to explain why damages awards in China’s
patent cases are so low, such as incompetence of the courts and the
government’s adherence to Confucian principles of community
commitment. 15 However, the most convincing theory attributes the low

11
Due to the unique structure of Chinese government, both the courts and executive agencies in
China actively participate in the legislation process. Therefore, these institutions are generally considered
key “policy makers.”
12
Zuigao Fayuan: Wanshan Zhuanli Qinquan Suihai Peichang Zhidu (最高法院：完善专利侵权损
害赔偿制度) [Supreme People’s Court: The improvement of the Current Compensation Regime of Patent
Protection],
CNIPR
(Mar.
5,
2015),
http://www.cnipr.com/sfsj/zscqfy/201503/t20150305_186983.htm?COLLCC=2247291050&.
13
Id.
14
Guanyu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa Xiugai Zaoan (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) De
Shuoming (关于《中华人民共和国专利法修改草案（征求意见稿）》的说明) [The Commentary on
the Proposed Draft of Amendment to the Patent Law of China (Draft for Public Comments)], STATE
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
OFFICE
OF
P.R.C.
(Apr.
2,
2015),
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/zcjd/201504/t20150402_1096196.html [hereinafter SIPO Commentary on
Fourth Amendment]; Zhuanli Lifa Wenda: Zhuanli Fa Disici Quanmian Xiugai (专利立法问答：专利法
第四次全面修改) [Q&As on Patent Legislation: The Fourth Comprehensive Amendment of the Patent
Law of China], STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF P.R.C. (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/ywzt/zlfjqssxzdscxg/xylzlfxg/201504/t20150424_1107544.html [hereinafter
Q&As on Fourth Amendment].
15
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 148–52; Edward J. Walneck, The Patent Troll or Dragon?: How
Quantity Issues and Chinese Nationalism Explain Recent Trends in Chinese Patent Law, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L
& COMP. LAW 435, 442–44 (2014).
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damages awards to the methodologies used when calculating damages. 16
Particularly, the predominance of statutory damages awards systematically
drive down the overall compensation level in patent cases.
A.

An Overview of Patent Damages Calculations in China

To further the analysis of this Article, it is instructive to provide an
overview of damages calculation methodologies in patent cases in China and
their application in reality. Article 65 of Chinese Patent Law of 2008
provides:
The amount of compensation for patent right infringement shall
be determined according to the patentee’s actual losses caused
by the infringement. If it is hard to determine the actual losses,
the amount of compensation may be determined according to
the benefits acquired by the infringer through the infringement.
If it is hard to determine the losses of the patentee [and] the
benefits acquired by the infringer, the amount of the
compensation may be determined according to the reasonably
multiplied amount of the royalties of that patent. The amount
of compensation shall include the reasonable expenses paid by
the patentee for putting an end to the infringement. If the losses
of the patentee, benefits of the infringer, [and] royalties of the
patent are all hard to determine, the people’s court may, on the
basis of the factors such as the type of patent right, nature of the
infringement, and seriousness of the case, determine the amount
of compensation within the range from 10,000 to 1,000,000
yuan (approximately $1,542 to $154,248 USD).17
As the statute indicates, the primary calculation method for patent
infringement actions should be based on patentee’s actual losses resulting
from the infringement. 18 Specifically, the Supreme People’s Court has
instructed the lower courts to consider “a reasonable profit of a patented
product” multiplied by the “number of patented products that patentee was
unable to sell due to the infringement” to determine the “patentee’s loss.” 19
16

Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 148–51; Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 16–18.
Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, art. 65.
18
Id.
19
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhuanli Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falv Wenti De Ruogan
Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理专利纠纷案件适用法律问题的若干规定) [Several Provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning the Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Dispute Cases]
(promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, June 6, 2001, amended for the first time by the Supreme
17

214

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 2

This approach reflects the general principle of equity found in Chinese civil
law, which aims to bring an injured party back to the same, but not a more
advantageous, position prior to the infringement.20 However, even though a
patentee’s loss is the primary calculation method in theory, it is rarely used
in practice. 21 In China, plaintiffs bear the burden to produce sufficient
evidence to establish the loss of sales as a result of the infringement, and in
most cases, they are unable to do so.22
As a patentee’s loss is almost impossible to establish, courts next look
into the infringer’s profits resulting from the infringement. The Supreme
People’s Court instructed the lower courts to multiply a “reasonable profit of
an infringing product” by the “quantity of the subject infringing products
available on the market” to determine the “infringer’s profits.” 23 However,
patentees encounter essentially the same obstacles here as they do in
establishing their loss. Like the patentee’s loss approach, patentees are
similarly required to produce sufficient evidence to prove the infringer’s
profits. 24 Such evidence is more likely in the infringers’ possession and
rarely does an infringer cooperate with the court in disclosing it. 25
If a patentee is unable to establish either its actual loss or the
infringer’s profits, the patentee can seek damages based on a “reasonable
royalty.” However, the applicability of this approach is extremely narrow in
reality as the courts require the patentee to supply at least one existing
license agreement regarding the disputed patent to establish the “royalty

People’s Court, Feb. 25, 2013, amended for the second time by the Supreme People’s Court, Jan. 19, 2015,
effective Feb. 1, 2015), art. 20, http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/sfjs/201510/t20151021_1191718.html)
[hereinafter Several Provisions 2015] (Article 20 provides that “the ‘actual loss’ under Patent Law Article
65 can be determined by multiplying the number of patent products that patentee was unable to sell due to
the infringement by a reasonable profit per product. If it is hard to determine the decreased number of
patent products resulting from the infringement, the actual loss can be determined by multiplying the
number of the subject infringing products available on the market by a reasonable profit per product.”).
20
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 146.
21
Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 17.
22
Id.; USPTO REPORT, supra note 4.
23
Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19 (noting that the infringer’s profits under Patent Law
Article 65 can be determined by multiplying the quantity of subject infringing products available on the
market by a reasonable profit of an infringing product).
24
Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 17–18.
25
Id.; Li-ming Li (李黎明), Zhuanli Qinquan Fading Peichang Zhong de Zhuti Tezheng he Chanye
Shuxing Yanjiu (专利侵权法定赔偿中的主体特征和产业属性研究) [Research on the Subject Nature and
Industrial Characteristics of Statutory Compensation in Patent Infringement], 37 No. 4 MOD. L. SCI. 170,
171 (July 2015), http://www.iprcn.com/UploadFiles/20151127100491861.pdf (noting that a lot of
companies relying on the excuse that its accounting system is under-developed to refuse to supply the
evidence needed to conduct damages calculation).
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rate.”26 In other words, patentees who have never licensed their patent or
patentees who licensed their technology at no monetary cost, such as a crosslicensing agreement, cannot deploy this method of damages calculation at all.
Where such a license agreement exists, the courts may use the royalty rate in
the license as a starting point, and consider adjusting factors, such as the
type of the subject patent, the nature and circumstances of the infringement,
and the nature, scope, and duration of the reference license.27
Finally, when all three methods mentioned above fail, the court will
impose statutory damages ranging between RMB 10,000 to RMB 1,000,000
(approximately $1,542 to $154,248). In determining the statutory damages,
the court may consider factors such as the type of the patent and the nature
and circumstances of the infringement.28 Even today, there is little guidance
from the statute itself or from the Supreme People’s Court on how to apply
this approach. It is not entirely clear whether this statutory damages
provision is compensatory or punitive in nature. There is some suggestion
that this provision was first introduced for compensatory purposes. 29
However, the Supreme People’s Court’s instruction for lower courts to
assess “the nature and the circumstances of the infringement” factor implies
that this provision also encompasses punitive considerations.30
B.

The Origin of the Statutory Damages in Chinese Patent Law

Early versions of the Patent Law of China did not contain a statutory
damages provision.31 The concept of statutory damages was first introduced
26
Yuan Xiaodong, Research on the Regulations of Patent Infringement Indemnification in China,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/Yuan%20Xiaodong%20paper.pdf.
27
Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19, art. 21.
28
Id.
29
See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
30
Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19, art. 21. See also Hongyan Shi (石红艳) & Shengye Lin
(林声烨), Zhishi Chanquan Qinquan Yinru Chengfaxing Peichang Zhibian (知识产权侵权引入惩罚性赔
偿之辩) [The Debate on Introducing Punitive Damages into Intellectual Property Protection], 3 INTELL.
PROP. (2013), http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_80421.shtml (noting that the “nature and
circumstances” analysis indicates the punitive nature of the statutory damages under Article 65 of Chinese
Patent Law).
31
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa (中华人民共和国专利法) [The Patent Law of
P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985),
http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2000/08/id/38517.shtml [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law of 1984];
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa 1992 Nian Xiuzheng An (中华人民共和国专利法 1992 年修正
案) [The 1992 Amendment to The Patent Law of P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s
Cong.,
Sept.
4,
1992,
effective
Jan.
1,
1993),
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/zl/fl/201509/t20150906_1171275.html [hereinafter Chinese Patent Law of
1992]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa 2000 Xiuzheng An (中华人民共和国专利法 2000 年修
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in 2001 by the Supreme People’s Court in its judicial interpretations of the
Chinese Patent Law of 2000.32 The 2001 judicial interpretations specify that
when a court is unable to apply the formal damages calculation approaches
— patentee’s losses, the infringer’s profits, and the reasonable royalty — to
determine a damages award in a patent case, it may award a “fixed amount
of damages” between RMB 5,000 to RMB 300,000 (approximately $772 to
$46,304).33 The Chinese Patent Law of 2008 formally codified the statutory
damages in its Article 65, but raised the statutory ranges to RMB 10,000RMB 1,000,000 (approximately $1,543 to $154,345). 34 This controlling
provision remains intact today. 35
The legislative intent behind the 2001 judicial interpretations relating
to the statutory damages is not entirely clear. One popular theory is that it
was heavily influenced by the ongoing development of Chinese Copyright
Law provisions relating to the statutory damages. 36 As early as 1995, the
Beijing High People’s Court issued an advisory opinion that is believed to
be the first attempt to advocate a statutory damages approach in intellectual
property cases.37 The opinion provides that:

正案) [The 2000 Amendment to the Patent Law of P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Aug. 25, 2000), http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2000/08/id/38517.shtml [hereinafter
Chinese Patent Law of 2000].
32
[Zuigaorenmingfayuanguanyushenlizhuanlijiufenanjianshiyongfalvweintideruoganguiding] (最高
人民法院关于审理专利纠纷案件适用法律问题的若干规定 ) [Several Provisions of the Supreme
People’s Court on Issues Concerning Applicable Laws to the Trial of Patent Controversies] (promulgated
by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 22, 2001, effective July 1, 2001), art. 21,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=1853&lib=law&SearchJCeyword=patent%25 [hereinafter Several
Provisions 2001].
33

Id.
Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2.
35
See Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19.
36
Even though it is not an official policy, the policy makers in China regularly look to the
development of copyright law in setting the course for patent law. For example, the Supreme People’s
Court issued its most recent Judicial Interpretation of Patent Law on March 22, 2016, and the Court
specifically acknowledges that several of the new interpretations were based on the court’s experience with
the enforcement of the Chinese Copyright Law. See Jing Liu (刘婧), Tongyi Xihua Zhuanli Qinquan
Caipan Biaozhun Yingzao Youliyu Chuangxin de Fazhi Huanjin (统一细化专利侵权裁判标准 营造有利
于创新的法制环境) [Setting Unified and Specified Standards for Patent Infringement Adjudication and
Creating Legal Environment that Helps Innovation], CHINA COURTS (Mar. 23, 2016),
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2016/03/id/1826733.shtml?from=singlemessage&isappinstalled=0.
37
Beijing Shi Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Yinfa Guanyu Shenli Jisuanji Ruanjian Zhuzuoquan Jiufen
Anjian De Jige Wenti De Yijian De Tongzhi (北京市高级人民法院关于印发《关于审理计算机软件著作
权纠纷案件的几个问题的意见》的通知) [Beijing People’s High Court Publishes the Opinion on Several
Issues on the Trial of the Software Copyright Disputes], CNIPR (Feb. 1, 2012), t
http://www.cnipr.net/article_show.asp?article_id=221 (last visited on Dec. 20, 2015).
34
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If the claimant in a copyright infringement case cannot
prove its actual loss or the unlawful gains of the infringer,
the infringer needs to compensate the right holder ranging
from RMB 5,000 to RMB 30,000. However, if the
infringer proved with sufficient evidence that he did not
know his action infringed the copyright of the right holder
and the resulting infringement is not serious, the court may
exercise its discretion to decrease the statutory damages to
an amount lower than RMB 5,000.38
In 2001, the same year in which statutory damages were first introduced into
the patent law through judicial interpretation, the Copyright Law of China
formally codified the statutory damages in Article 48. 39 The statute reads
that “in a copyright infringement case, if the actual loss of the right holder
and the unlawful gains of the infringer is hard to measure, the court may
award the right holder statutory damages lower than RMB 500,000 by its
discretion.”40 This appeared to be the court’s attempt to establish a uniform
standard for calculating damages for copyright infringement in light of the
challenges posed by rise of software copyright, and this attempt likely
spilled over to patent law.
On top of the influence of the copyright law, another impetus for
introducing the concept of statutory damages was to handle the difficulties in
determining the patentee’s actual losses and infringer’s profits in patent
cases.41 Accordingly, the statutory damages served as a last-resort approach
to guarantee some minimal compensation available for injured patentees.42
The order of preference for the four damages calculation methods as listed in
Article 65 of the Patent Law confirms that the statutory damages approach is
supposed to be deployed as the last resort.43
38

Id.
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa 2001 Nian Xiuzheng (中华人民共和国著作权法
2001 年修正) [Copyright Law of P.R.C. of 2001] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Congress, Oct. 27, 2001), art. 48,
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/bq/fljxzfg/201310/t20131025_863141.html
[hereinafter
Chinese
Copyright Law of 2001].
40
Id.
41
Yuan Xiaodong, supra note 26, at 8-9.
42
Id.
43
Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, art. 65 (noting that the four calculation methods should
be deployed in the following sequential order in term of preference: 1) patentee’s losses, 2) infringer’s
profits, 3) reasonable royalty, and 4) statutory damages); see also, Several Provisions 2001, supra note 32,
art. 21.
39
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The Predominance of the Statutory Damages

Ironically, the alleged “last-resort” approach of statutory damages
became so overwhelmingly popular among the courts that it is essentially the
exclusive method for damages calculations today. One survey concluded
that, between 2002 and 2010, 94.8% of all the patent cases calculated
damages under the statutory damages approach. 44 According to another
survey conducted by China Patent Agent (Hong Kong) Ltd., the peak year
was 2009 when more than 99% of patent damages awards were based on the
statutory damages approach, and the average award was a little less than
RMB 100,000 (approximately $15,425).45 The situation appears to improve
only slightly after the Third Amendment to Patent Law took effect in 2009.
Statistics reveal that from 2008 to 2013 courts still used the statutory
damages approach in 97.25% of patent infringement cases. 46 Essentially,
this statutory damage provision swallowed the entire Article 65 of the
Chinese Patent Law.
Notably, courts rarely award damages close to the upper limit of the
statutory range. 47 Based on the survey of China Patent Agent Ltd., the
average damages awards based on the statutory damages approach from
2008 to 2013 was merely RMB 80,000 (approximately $12,340). 48 In
contrast, there were 42 published patent opinions that adopted non-statutory
damages approaches between 2002 and 2010, and the average damages
award for these cases was RMB 2,450,000 (approximately $377,521), four
times as much as the average award under the statutory damages approach. 49
It is pretty obvious that the predominance of statutory damages awards in

44

Li-ming Li, supra note 25, at 171.
Cheng Miao, supra note 4, at 17.
46
LEGAL DAILY (法制日报), 97% Zhuanli Qinquan An Panjue Caiqu Fading Peichang (97%专利侵
权案判决采取法定赔偿) [97% Court Decisions on Patent Infringement Adopt Statutory Damages as the
Method
for
Damages
Calculation],
PEOPLE.CN
(Apr.
16,
2013),
http://ip.people.com.cn/n/2013/0416/c136655-21148974.html (according to one survey conducted by the
Intellectual Property Law Center of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, only 10% of the
patentees choose to enforce their patent after discovering infringement, and 97.25% of patent decisions
choose the statutory damages approach. The research further revealed that the average damages award in
statutory damages cases is only RMB 80,000 which is even lower than the fees needed for applying and
maintaining a patent).
47
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151.
48
LEGAL DAILY, supra note 46.
49
Li-ming Li, supra note 25, at 171.
45
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patent cases significantly drives down the overall compensation level for
patent infringement.50
Curiously, the 2008–2013 five-year average was lower than the
annual average of the year of 2009, even though the Third Amendment
raised the maximum statutory damages from RMB 500,000 (approximately
$77,124) to RMB 1,000,000 (approximately $154,248) in 2009. 51 This
indicates that simply increasing the upper limit of the statutory damages
range did little, if any, to alleviate the inadequate compensation problem.
D.

Explanations for the Predominance of the Statutory Damages
Approach

There are several reasons why the statutory damages approach is so
popular among Chinese litigators and courts. The most apparent reason is
the difficulties in applying the other three damages calculation methods. 52
In China, a plaintiff generally bears the burden to produce sufficient
evidence to establish the claimed damages. 53 This is an extremely high
burden in reality. For example, courts generally require plaintiffs claiming
damages under the patentee’s losses theory to supply evidence establishing:
(1) the market demand for the patented products, (2) the patentee’s ability to
manufacture and market the patented products, (3) the quantity of patented
products that could have been sold but for the infringement, and (4) a
reasonable profit for the patented product.54 Here, courts specifically require
the plaintiff to prove a direct causation between the infringement and the
patentee’s loss, which is extremely difficult to do.55
To establish damages under the infringer’s profits theory, a court
generally requires the plaintiff to prove: (1) that the allegedly infringing
products are available on the market, (2) the quantity of infringing products

50

Id. (noting that, in cases where statutory damages approach is adopted, the average damages award
is RMB 80,000, whereas the average damages award is RMB 150,000 where the other three approaches are
used to calculate the damages); Chinese Intellectual Property Judges Panel, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
61, 63 (2011) (Professor Yi Jianiong from the Southwest University of Political Science & Law pointed out
that the predominance of statutory awards drove down the average damages awards in patent cases and a
patentee can only get 15% of what he claims on average); Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151.
51
LEGAL DAILY, supra note 46; Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2.
52
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 148–50.
53
Id.
54
Yuan Xiaodong, supra note 26, at 5–6.
55
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 150.
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available on the market, (3) the reasonable profits of an infringing product,
and (4) the actual profits obtained by the infringer.56
To claim damages under the reasonable royalty theory, a plaintiff
must supply an actual license agreement of the patent, something that few
plaintiffs are able to provide.57
To make matters worse, there is very little discovery in China, and the
accused infringers generally have no obligation or incentive to produce the
requested documents. 58 Nor can courts in China effectively compel the
production of documents, which leaves the infringer to dictate the agenda by
deciding whether he will cooperate in turning over the requested evidence. 59
As a result, plaintiffs in most patent cases fail to produce sufficient evidence
to establish damages under the first three calculation methods and are forced
to resort to the statutory damages approach.
Beneath the surface, courts also have ample reasons to prefer statutory
damages over the other three approaches in determining damages awards. 60
For one thing, courts in China are under enormous time pressure when
adjudicating patent cases.61 Typically, it only takes a Chinese trial court six
to seven months to adjudicate an entire patent case which includes both the
liability determination and the damages determination. 62 Similarly, a typical
patent appeal only takes three to four months.63 For companies used to U.S.style multi-year patent litigation, the Chinese courts are “rocket dockets.”64
Compared to the statutory damages approach, the other three methods are
substantially more time-consuming to apply since extensive fact-finding and
evidence examination are typically required. Consequently, courts eager to
meet deadlines and get the docket moving are inherently biased in deploying
56

Yuan Xiaodong, supra note 26, at 6–7.
Id.
58
CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND C ASE COMMENTARIES §1.14 (2014).
59
Id.; Yangcheng Evening News, supra note 7 (noting that the alleged infringer regularly refuses to
produce book keeping records and other financial documents necessary to determine damages).
60
In theory, the courts should consider the other three methods before resorting to the statutory
damages approach. However, in reality, the courts exercise great discretion over whether to admit relevant
evidence pertaining to the damages calculation. Accordingly, whether a statutory damages approach is
adopted is a matter of discretion for the courts.
61
Anthony C. Chen, Benefiting From China’s Booming Market Without Losing Control of Your
Crown Jewels: IP Issues for Foreign Business in China, 2011 WL 2532948, at *5 (2011).
62
Id.; see also, CIELA Report, supra note 5.
63
Chen, supra note 61, at *5. It shall be noted that the legal system in China is different from the
U.S. system in terms of the scope of review. A Chinese appeal court can review factual issues as well as
legal issues.
64
Id.
57
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calculation methodologies in patent cases. Moreover, courts applying the
statutory damages approach are less likely to be overturned on appeals, even
if the award is unjustifiably low. 65 Damages awards under the statutory
damages approach are highly discretionary, and patentees usually have few
viable arguments to challenge the decisions on appeal. 66 This type of
appeal-proof opinion is particularly attractive to the lower court judges in
light of the Chinese judicial system’s long history of penalizing lower court
judges based on reversal rates of their cases.67
III.

LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS
DAMAGES

FOR

ELIMINATING STATUTORY

A careful examination of the statutory damages’ justifications and
policy implications reveals that statutory damages no longer serve any
legitimate purpose in China’s patent system and actually cause more harm
than good.
A.

The Justification of the Statutory Damages Based on TRIPs
Obligation is Misleading

Some scholars in China attempted to justify the Patent Law’s statutory
damages provision by characterizing it as an obligation under the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs agreement), of which China is a
65

Congying Xu (徐聪颖), Woguo Zhuanli Quan Fading Peichang de Shijian he Fansi (我国专利权
法定赔偿的实践和反思) [The Experiment of and the Reflection on the Statutory Damages Provision in
Chinese
Patent
Law],
IPR
CHINA
(Mar.
9,
2015),
http://www.iprcn.com/IL_Lwxc_Show.aspx?News_PI=2511 (last visited Mar. 11, 2016) (the author
sampled 405 patent damages decision under the statutory damages approach, and found patentees appeared
in 223 cases, but only 7 cases, or 3.86% of the appealed cases, were successful); IP-Lantai (兰台知识产权
团队), Chengfa Xing Peichang Zhidu Neng Jiejue Zhuanli Peichang Di de Jiongjing Ma? (惩罚性赔偿制
度能解决专利侵权赔偿低的窘境吗？) [Can Punitive Damages Solve the Dilemma of Low Damages
Awards in Patent Infringement?], INTELLIGEAST (Apr. 29, 2015), http://zhihedongfang.com/article-9598/
(last visited Mar. 12, 2016) (noting that statutory damages in patent cases provide judges a shield from
being labeled as “radical” in China).
66
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151.
67
For a very long time, the courts in China evaluated lower court judges’ performances under the socalled “judicial responsibility system”, which penalized judges with high reversal rates and promoted
judges with lower reversal rates on appeal. However, the “judicial responsibility system” was recently
abandoned. See Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial
Chinese Heritage Lives On, 39 N.M. L. REV. 63, 67–73 (2009); Nathan Snyder, Putting Numbers to
Feelings: Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in China’s Courts –Evidence from Zhejiang Province
Trademark Infringement Cases 2004-2009, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 349, 370 (2012).
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member state.68 This contention is rather misleading. Granted, the WTO
and related international treaties profoundly shaped the intellectual property
regime in China, and many of the current Patent Law provisions do reflect
TRIPs obligations. 69 However, the TRIPs provision relating to statutory
damages is permissive, not mandatory. 70 Article 45 of the TRIPs agreement
provides that each member state’s “judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the infringer to pay the right holder damages adequate to
compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered[,]” but only “[i]n
appropriate cases, Member may authorize the judicial authorities to order
recovery of profits and/or payment of pre-established damages . . . .”71 The
TRIPs agreement provides no definition for the “appropriate cases,” but
rather leaves it to each member state to tailor this provision according to its
domestic concerns.72
Further, Article 45 of the TRIPs agreement is a general provision
concerning damages for all intellectual property rights. Even if, arguendo,
this provision could be interpreted to require each member state to preserve
the statutory damages scheme in some form as a compensation mechanism,
it does not necessarily follow that the member state has to preserve it in all
intellectual property fields. For example, the United States provides
statutory damages in its copyright law but not in its patent law. 73 Nobody
seems to suggest that this arrangement results in a violation of the TRIPs
agreement. Finally, even among the member states of the TRIPs agreement,
Yan Hu (胡燕), Zhuanli Fa Disanci Xiugai Yu TRIPS Xieyi (专利法第三次修改与 TRIPS 协议)
[The Third Amendment to the Patent Law and the TRIPS Agreement], LAWTIME.CN (Apr. 4, 2007),
http://www.lawtime.cn/info/zhuanli/zlnews/2007040435396.html (noting that the addition of statutory
damages provision in the third amendment to the patent law is a reflection of the Article 45 of the TRIPS
agreement).
69
Natalie P. Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO over China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 34
SYDNEY L. REV. 65 (2012); Walneck, supra note 15, at 439; Joshua J. Galgano, Patent Reform under the
America Invents Act: Does China’s Success After the 2009 Chinese Patent Reform Predict Similar Success
for the U.S. Patent Regime?, 23 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 199–200 (2014); Raymond M.
Gabriel, The Patent Revolution: Proposed Reforms in Chinese Intellectual Property Law, Policy, and
Practice Are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent Protection in China, 9 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 323, 332
(2008); Guangliang Zhang, Remedies for Patent Infringement: A Comparative Study of U.S. and Chinese
Law, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 35, 67–68 (2001).
70
Pamela Samuelson, Phil Hill & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages: A Rarity in Copyright Laws
Internationally, but for How Long?, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 529, 565–66 (2013).
71
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 45, Apr. 15, 1994, 108
Stat. 4809, [hereinafter TRIPs] (emphasis added), https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
72
Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 565–66; see generally Henning Grosse RuseKhan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and Subsequent TRIPS-plus Free Trade Agreements:
Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP . L. 325 (2011).
73
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006) (the damages provision for U.S. copyright law), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2012) (the damages provision for U.S. patent law).
68

April 2017

Chinese Patent Law’s Statutory Damages Provision

223

a statutory damages provision is an exception, rather than the norm. 74
Therefore, the contention that the TRIPs agreement mandates a statutory
damages provision in Chinese Patent Law is simply nonsensible and
unsupported.
B.

The Justification Based on Consistency of IP Protections is
Unconvincing

As discussed above, it is possible that the statutory damages provision
in China’s patent law is a spillover/parallel of the statutory damages
provision found in China’s copyright law. 75 Accordingly, another potential
justification for the patent law’s statutory damages provision is to maintain
the consistency among the branches of intellectual property protection, as
the statutory damages award is available in both China’s Copyright Law and
the Trademark Law. 76 However, this argument is quite unpersuasive
because the three major branches of intellectual property law have already
diverged significantly as the result of independent development. For
example, the lower limit for patent statutory damages is RMB 10,000
whereas there is no minimum statutory damages in trademark or copyright
law. 77 There does not seem to be any satisfying justification for this
particular inconsistency. One might theorize that the different treatments are
driven by the fact that a patent, on average, retains a higher valuation than a
copyrighted work or a registered trademark. However, the fact that
trademark law recently raised the maximum statutory damages to RMB
3,000,000, which triples the maximum statutory damages for patent
infringements, effectively rebuts this theory.78

74

Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 565–66; see also Pamela Samuelson & Tara
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.
439, 441 (2009).
75
See supra Part IIB.
76
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuzuoquan Fa (中华人民共和国著作权法) [Copyright Law of
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990,
effective June 1, 1991), art. 48, translated in STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE P.R.C.,
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/relatedlaws/200804/t20080416_380362.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2016);
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangbiao Fa (中华人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective
Mar. 1, 1983), art. 63, http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/flfg1/flfg/201309/t20130903_137807.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2016).
77
See Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, at art. 65; Copyright Law of People’s Republic of
China, supra note 76, at art. 48; Trademark Law of People’s Republic of China, supra note 76, at art. 63.
78
See Chinese Patent Law of 2008, supra note 2, at art. 65; Trademark Law of People’s Republic of
China, supra note 76, at art. 63.

224

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 26 NO. 2

Moreover, unfair competition law is often viewed as another major
branch of intellectual property law in China, and a comparison of the
damages provisions between patent law and unfair competition law is
particularly illuminating to the analysis here. 79 Article 20 of the Unfair
Competition Law provides two damages calculation methods that are similar
to the patent law: (1) the actual losses of the injured party, and (2) the
accused party’s unlawful gains resulting from the unlawful practice. 80 There
is no statutory damages approach available when determining unfair
competition damages.81 Without statutory damages as a shortcut, courts are
forced to apply the injured party’s losses approach and infringer’s profits
approach honestly in determining damages.
Case law demonstrates that courts are more than competent to
determine fair damages in unfair competition claims without employing the
statutory damages method. For example, in Qihoo 360 Tech. Co., Ltd. v.
Sogou Info. Serv. Co., Ltd., the plaintiff Sogou Information Services
Company (Sogou) brought an unfair competition claim against its
competitor Qihoo 360 Technology Company (Qihoo). 82 The court found
that Qihoo, as the developer of the anti-virus software 360 Total Security,
violated the Unfair Competition Law of China by designing 360 Total
Security to improperly interfere with the consumers’ ability to install and use
the Sogou internet browser.83 In determining the damages award, the court
provided a specific illustration of the damages calculation claimed by the
plaintiff, detailing the internet browser’s sales and profit models. 84 Even
79

Chengsi Zheng (郑成思), Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng: Zhishi Chanquan de Fujia Baohua (反不
正 当 竞 争 ： 知 识 产 权 的 附 加 保 护 ) [Unfair Competition Law: The Complementary Protection for
Intellectual Property], IOLAW.ORG.CN, http://www.iolaw.org.cn/shownews.asp?id=4017 (last visited Mar.
12, 2016); Yadong Wang & Lei Lu, The PRC Anti-unfair Competition Law and Intellectual Property
Protection,
CHINA
BUS.
J.
62
(Feb.
2010),
http://cblj.com/cblj/correspondent/1dfba0b743ddfb65b2e9e41ffa1abc32.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
80
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Buzhengdang Jingzheng Fa (中华人民共和国反不正当竞争
法) [Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), art. 20, translated in STATE INTELL.
PROP. OFF. OF THE P.R.C., http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/relatedlaws/200804/t20080416_380359.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2016).
81
Id.
82
Beijing Qihu Keji Youxian Gongsi yu Beijing Sougou Xinxi Fuwu Youxian Gongsi Buzhengdang
Jingzheng An (北京奇虎科技有限公司与北京搜狗信息服务有限公司不正当竞争案) [Qihoo 360 Tech.
Co., Ltd. v. Sogou Info. Serv. Co., Ltd.], CIVIL HIGH COURT (IP) FINAL TRIAL NO. 1071 (Beijing High
People’s
Ct.
2015)
[hereinafter
Qihoo
v.
Sogou],
http://www.court.gov.cn/zgcpwsw/content/content?DocID=2748b533-1938-472f-b7e86afafb820acf&KeyWord=(2015)高民(知)终字第 1071 号 (last visited Dec. 28, 2015).
83
Id.
84
Id.
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though the amount of damages proposed by plaintiff was not fully adopted,
the court nonetheless found plaintiff’s user-based model for profits
calculation persuasive. 85 Based on this model and statistics compiled by an
independent consulting company, i-Research Consulting Group, the court
concluded that Sogou lost approximately two million users as a result of
Qihoo’s unfair competition practice, and rendered an adequate compensation
accordingly. 86 This case illustrates that courts in China are capable of
rendering a fair damages award without deploying the statutory damages
method. Even assuming that maintaining consistency among all branches of
China’s intellectual property regime is a legitimate policy goal, Qihoo v.
Sogou makes a compelling argument that the statutory damages provisions
in China’s different IP regimes should be eliminated altogether. Therefore,
the justification based on consistency of China’s intellectual property
protection regimes is not only unconvincing, but also self-defeating.
C.

The Argument That Patentees Prefer Statutory Damages is
Illogical

In real practice, a patentee in China may forego the other three more
burdensome damages calculation methods and directly request the court to
apply the statutory damages approach. A survey conducted by the
Intellectual Property Law Center at the Zhongnan University of Economics
and Law indicates that patentees did so in 93.2% of cases.87 Based on this
statistic, some argue that the statutory damages approach is actually
preferred by patentees. 88 However, this argument is illogical because it
confuses cause and effect. As illustrated above, a patentee’s damages claim
based on the three non-statutory-damages approaches rarely succeeds in
court due to the heavy evidentiary burden and the courts’ subtle bias against
these methodologies. 89 It would be absurd to assume that patentees, as
practical and rational beings, would dispense resources unnecessarily in an
attempt to satisfy the other three more demanding approaches, which are
destined to fail in most cases. In other words, the majority of patentees

85

Id.
Id.
87
Zhixing Chen, Fading Peichang Weihe Zaoshou Goubing? (法定赔偿为何遭受诟病?) [Why is
the
Statutory
Damages
Award
Heavily
Criticized?],
ZHICHANLI.COM,
http://www.zhichanli.com/article/7968 (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
88
Id.
89
See supra Part IID.
86
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directly requested the statutory damages approach because of the futility of
doing otherwise, not because of their preference for statutory damages.90
D.

Statutory Damages are Detrimental to the Legitimacy of
China’s Patent System

A more fundamental problem with a statutory damages award is that it
is so inherently “arbitrary, inconsistent, [and] unprincipled” that it is
detrimental to the legitimacy of China’s patent system.91
When determining statutory damages, the Supreme People’s Court
instructed the lower courts to consider factors including the type of the
patent and the infringement’s nature and circumstances.92 As a theoretical
issue, it is unclear how to engage in this analysis consistently, and whether
the lower courts should conduct extensive fact-findings and evidence
examinations when assessing these two factors. If extensive fact-findings
and evidence-examinations are required, there seems to be no need for the
statutory damages approach since it will essentially collapse into the
patentee’s losses approach or the infringer’s profits approach.93
As a practical matter, there is little evidence that lower courts conduct
the two-factor analysis at all when awarding statutory damages. A typical
opinion awarding statutory damages in a patent case reads: “Since the losses
of the patent owner and the unlawful gains of the defendant is hard to prove,
this court decided, at its discretion, considering the type of the patent, nature
and circumstances of the infringement, that the damages award is RMB
[amount awarded].” 94 This widely used boilerplate language reveals few
90

Congying Xu, supra note 65 (discussing that the majority of the patentees are not free to choose,
but in reality must use the damages calculation methods).
91
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 441 (discussing how the statutory damages in U.S.
copyright law are “arbitrary, inconsistent, [and] unprincipled”); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[E][1][a] (2012) (“[T]he truth is that statutory damages fluctuate
wildly.”).
92
Several Provisions 2015, supra note 19, at art. 21.
93
The “nature and circumstances of the infringement” factor is particularly difficult to assess
without an extensive fact-finding process. It is not entirely clear what elements the lower courts should
consider in assessing the “nature and circumstances” factor. Logically speaking, both “patentee’s losses”
and “infringer’s profits” should be integral parts of “nature and circumstances” factor. However, if the
courts consider patentee’s losses or the infringer’s profits, the statutory damages analysis would be
rendered meaningless because the analysis it entails would be the same as either the patentee’s losses
approach or the infringer’s profits approach.
94
See, e.g., Xushui Xian Huaguang Shizheng Jiancai Youxian Gongsi yu Tianjin Shi Jinnan Baitangkou Zhuzao
Chang deng Zhuanli Qinquan An (徐水县华光市政建材有限公司与天津市津南白塘口铸造厂等专利侵权案)
[Huaguang City Contr. Co., Ltd. v. Jinnan Baitangkou Foundry], JIN HIGH COURT THIRD (FINAL) TRIAL NO. 41 (Tianjin
High People’s Ct. 2005), http://china.findlaw.cn/info/cpws/mscpws/218255_2.html; Tongxiang Shi Zili Youxian Zeren
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justifications behind a court’s reasoning when awarding damages and
renders the Supreme Court’s instruction on the “type of patent and the
infringement’s nature and circumstances” factors largely superfluous.
In addition, this mechanism of setting statutory damages makes little
policy sense. As mentioned before, in 2001, the Supreme People’s Court set
a range for statutory damages between RMB 5,000 to RMB 300,000
(approximately $772 to $46,304). 95 The 2008 amendments to patent law
raised the range to RMB 10,000 to RMB 1,000,000 (approximately $1,543
to $154,345). The draft for the Fourth Amendment to Chinese Patent Law
circulated in 2015, which is the most recent attempt to revise the patent law,
proposes to further raise the range to RMB 100,000 to RMB 5,000,000
(approximately $15,435 to $757,432). 96 There appears to be little logic
articulated in setting the statutory damages range other than increasing it
over time. The selections of the upper and lower limits seem quite random,
with little empirical backing. Due to the long period of time needed to
amend the patent law, this top-down approach of adjusting the statutory
damages range seems to be particularly ill-fitted to deal with the ever
changing reality of modern economy and technology. 97 Essentially, policy
makers task themselves to play the indefinite “catch-up” game in setting the
statutory range, which seems to be quite unnecessary.
The most problematic aspect of statutory damages is that they
facilitate inappropriate behaviors, corruption, and local protectionism, which
eventually undermine public confidence in China’s judicial institutions. As
illustrated above, there is little transparency in a typical statutory damages
Gongsi yu Yan Xiuzhang Zhuanli Qinquan An (桐乡市自力有限责任公司与严秀章专利侵权案) [Zili Ltd. v. Yan
Xiuzhang], HANG CIVIL THIRD TRIAL NO. 060 (Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Ct. 2005),
http://2007.cnarb.com/zscq/P/patenttorts/201203/53974.html.
95
Several Provisions 2001, supra note 32, at art. 21.
96
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Xiuding Caoan (Songshen Gao) ji Duizhao Biao (中华人
民共和国专利修订草案（送审稿）及对照表) [The Draft for Amendments to Patent Law (Draft for
Review) and The Comparison Table], LEGIS. AFF. OFF. OF THE ST. COUNCIL P.R. CHINA (Dec. 2, 2015)
[hereinafter
the
Draft
for
the
Fourth
Amendments
to
Chinese
Patent
Law],
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/cazjgg/201512/20151200479591.shtml, translated in CHINA L.
TRANSLATE, http://chinalawtranslate.com/scpatentdraft/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016); see also SIPO
Commentary on Fourth Amendment, supra note 14; Q&As on Fourth Amendment, supra note 14.
97
Generally speaking, the Chinese Patent Law is scheduled to be amended every eight years, and
each round of amendment takes years to finalize. For example, for the Third Amendment, the amendment
process began with the SIPO’s notice seeking public comment on April 1, 2005, and the final amendment
was not approved until December 27, 2008, which means the whole process took more than three years.
See Zhuanli Fa Xiugai Licheng ( 专 利 法 的 修 改 历 程 ) [The History of Patent Law Amendments],
GAOHANGIP (June 17, 2015), http://www.gaohangip.com/baike/2941.
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opinion, as most courts only recite boilerplate language. 98 At a minimum,
some judges, under the pressure of time, deploy the statutory damages
approach as a shortcut around the time-consuming fact-finding and evidence
examination processes. 99 In this scenario, a statutory damages award
provides a cover-up for a judge who abandons his or her duty as an
adjudicator, and reduces the court’s role to a random-number-generator in
assessing damages awards. On a more serious note, an extremely low
damages award in a patent case might well be the product of corruption or
other political considerations.100 This would be a serious setback for recent
attempts to strengthen China’s judiciary. 101 Additionally, it has been long
observed that the corruption problem in China is often intertwined with local
protectionism, which further incentivizes the lower courts to deploy the
statutory damages approach. 102 As discussed before, the bare-bone
recitation of boilerplate language in a statutory damages award opinion
renders it impossible for patentees to raise any viable legal or factual
argument on appeal.103 As a result, an appellate court reviewing a statutory
damages award has little means to detect or combat local protectionism,
even if it wants to.
Taken together, not only is the existence of statutory damages in
China’s patent law unjustifiable, its prevalence is actually damaging the
legitimacy of its entire patent system. Consequently, we strongly advocate
the elimination of the statutory damages provision in Article 65 of Chinese
Patent Law, which would, in turn, encourage the development of the other
three more robust damages calculation approaches.

98

See supra text accompanying note 93.
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 157.
100
Id.; Wu, supra note 4, at 590–93 (noting that local government corruption is a major hindrance to
the patent law enforcement); IP-Laitai, supra note 65 (noting that avoiding social instability is one reason
why many judges choose low damages awards).
101
Susan Finder, China’s Master Plan for Remaking Its Courts, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 26, 2015),
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/chinas-master-plan-for-remaking-its-courts/; Stanley Lubman, Power Shift:
Hopeful Signs in China’s Legal Reform Plan, WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2014),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/07/10/power-shift-hopeful-signs-in-chinas-legal-reform-plan/;
Improving Professionalism Among China’s Judges, GR. BRIT. CHINA C TR. (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.gbcc.org.uk/improving-professionalism-among-chinas-judges.aspx.
102
Wu, supra note 4, at 590–93; Walneck, supra note 15, at 442, 462–66.
103
Yieyie Yang, supra note 4, at 151.
99
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STATUTORY DAMAGES SCHEME: A

Interestingly, policy makers in China recognize the inadequate
compensation problem in patent law and statutory damages’ key role in
causing this problem, but nonetheless do not appear to be eager to eliminate
the provision as we propose here. 104 This general attitude of the policy
makers invites the question whether the current statutory damages provision
in Chinese patent law can be reformed to provide adequate compensation. A
comparative examination of the statutory damages provision in U.S.
copyright law suggests that the answer is “maybe.” The U.S. copyright law
experience also shows that reforming the statutory damages provision, as
opposed to abolishing it entirely, hardly leads to a long term resolution.
Even though the statutory damages provision in U.S. copyright law does not
have an under-compensation problem, the inherent rigidity and arbitrariness
of a statutory damages approach still leads to other serious problems for U.S.
copyright enforcement, which put its sustainability in doubt.
From the outset, an examination of U.S. copyright law is instructive
for two reasons. First, U.S. copyright law experienced hundreds of years of
development and its statutory damages provision was revised numerous
times, which is illuminating for the path ahead of Chinese patent law.
Second, the United States is often the most eager advocate to expand the
statutory damages approach globally, and consequently exerts tremendous
influence over other countries’ implementations of statutory damages
schemes.105
A.

History of Statutory Damages in the United States Copyright
Law

The roots of the statutory damages regime in U.S. copyright law can
be traced all the way back to the Statute of Anne in the Great Britain. 106
Specifically, the statute required the “offender” of any author’s copyright to
forfeit the sum of “One Peny [sic] for every Sheet which shall be found in
his, her, or their Custody, either Printed or Printing, Published or Exposed to
104

See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text; see also the Draft for the Fourth Amendments to
Chinese Patent Law, supra note 96, at art. 68 (revising Art. 65 of Chinese Patent of 2008 to increase the
statutory damages ranges to RMB 100,000 – RMB 5,000,000).
105
Samuelson, Hill & Wheatland, supra note 70, at 536–44 (noting that U.S. has been influential in
encouraging implementation of a statutory damages provision in numerous countries through international
treaties or its Special 301 procedures).
106
Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne) 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19 (Eng.).
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Sale.” 107 Half of this amount went to the Crown and the remaining half
belonged to the copyright holder.108 The United States inherited this basic
framework in its Copyright Act of 1790, but broadened the scope of author’s
right to include maps and charts, and set damages for published works at 50
cents for “every sheet which shall be found in [offender’s] possession.” 109
The Copyright Act of 1790 was subsequently amended several times, which
largely expanded the statutory damages provision.110
The Copyright Act was amended in 1895 to increase the penalty for
infringement to $1 per sheet for infringements in all works covered by the
statute, with the exception that in the case of a painting, status, and statuary,
the amount increased to $10 per sheet.111 Most notably for the purpose of
this Article, this amendment set up a range-based penalty, as opposed to the
per-sheet penalty, for “a photograph made from any object not a work of
fine arts” to be no less than $100 and not greater than $5,000. 112 This
specific cap on the recovery of statutory damages for photographic works
was largely pushed by newspaper publishers who had to pay excessive
damages for unknowingly printing and circulating millions of infringing
copies of a photograph. 113 As one practitioner noted, “the adoption of
minimum and maximum statutory amounts was significant because it
signaled a concern that statutory damages could be immense if they were not
limited, particularly as technology made copying of mass quantities of
physical works easier.”114
The Copyright Act went through a comprehensive overhaul in 1909,
which set up the modern scheme for copyright protection. The 1909 Act
107

Id. § 2.
Id.
109
Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). Similar to the Statute of Anne, half of
the amount went to the author and the other half went to the United States government.
110
See Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 6, 4 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870); Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch.
169, 11 Stat. 138 (repealed 1870).
111
Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 194, 28 Stat. 965 (repealed 1909) (amending Copyright Act of 1870, ch.
230, 16 Stat. 198 (repealed 1952)).
112
Id. However, it should be noted that this Act was not the first copyright legislation that set up a
range-based penalty. Several U.S. colonies already included range-based statutory damages provisions in
their copyright laws. See William F. Patry, The Right to a Jury Trial in Copyright Cases, 29 J. COPYRIGHT
SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 150 (1981). In 1856, Congress also amended the copyright law to allow copyright
owners to recover not less than $100 for the first, nor less than $50 for subsequent, unauthorized public
performances of dramatic compositions. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
113
Stephanie Berg, Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for Secondary Copyright Infringement
Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital Age, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265,
276–77 (2009).
114
Id. at 277.
108
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provided major reforms in three respects.115 First, the Act authorized the
award of actual damages and defendant’s profits (or the “in lieu”
damages). 116 Second, the Act eliminated the per-sheet penalty, whose
previous penal functions were served instead by a criminal provision for
willful infringing for profit, and whose compensatory and deterrent
functions were taken on by the availability of monetary relief for actual
damages and defendant’s profits. 117 Third, a new generalized regime of
statutory damages was created, available “in lieu” of actual damages and
defendant’s profits.118 Specifically, a court was directed to make awards in
an amount that was “just,” but within range for statutory damages between
$250 and $5,000 per infringement.119 Subsequently, courts interpreted that
statutory damages should be used as an alternative to actual damages or
profits when such damages or profits are hard to prove, and thus refused to
award statutory damages when actual damages or profits could be proven. 120
It has been noted that the U.S. Congress largely designed the statutory
damages scheme for a compensatory rather than a deterrent purpose.121
After decades of public debate and preparation, the U.S. Congress
enacted a completely new copyright act in 1976.122 Under Section 504 of
the new act, a plaintiff may elect either actual damages plus infringer’s profit
or statutory damages. 123 If the plaintiff chooses to pursue statutory damages,
a court may still consider evidence of actual damages and profits in
calculating the statutory damages award. 124 Under the original version of
1976 Act, the range of a statutory damages award per work infringed was
“not less than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court consider just,” but if
the copyright owner proved that the “infringement was committed willfully,
the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a

115
116
117

Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 448.
Id.
Copyright Act of 1909, §§ 25, 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081–82 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)

(2006)).
118

Id.
Id.
120
See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1940); Zeigelheim v.
Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
121
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 450–51.
122
Copyrights Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
504 (2011)).
123
See H.R. REP. 94-1476, 162, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2010)).
124
H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 161.
119
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sum of not more than $50,000.”125 This statutory range was subsequently
increased multiple times over the years.
The Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 further doubled the statutory damages range to
$500–$20,000 for non-willful infringement, and correspondingly increased
the upper-limit for willful infringement to $100,000.126 The Digital Theft
Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999 once again
increased the statutory damages range by 50%, $750–$30,000 per work
infringed for non-willful infringement and set a maximum of $150,000 per
work infringed for willful infringement. 127 These statutory ranges remain in
force today. At this point, commentators have observe that “[t]he
application of statutory damages has too often strayed from the largely
compensatory impulse . . . and has focused too heavily on deterrence and
punishment by holding many ordinary infringements to be willful, which has
resulted in many awards that are punitive in effect and often in intent.”128
Though the exact mechanism of Chinese patent law’s statutory
damages scheme is different from that of U.S. copyright law, the patterns of
their development reveal some common themes. For example, the statutory
damages schemes in both systems appear to stem from similar concerns. It
appears that the U.S. Congress adopted statutory damages because it was
difficult to calculate actual damages in copyright cases. 129 As we noted
above, this was also likely the initial legislative intent for adopting the
statutory damages approach in China’s patent law. 130 Further, the policy
makers in both countries had to constantly readjust the statutory damages
ranges to handle new realities of modern economics and technology.
Accordingly, the U.S. copyright law experience reveals some of the
struggles that the Chinese Patent Law’s statutory damages scheme is likely
to face going forward.

125
Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504(c) (1976), as reprinted in 5 KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND ANALYTICAL INDEX OF M ATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF
1976, at 163–64 (Alan Latman & James F. Lightstone eds., 1984).
126
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 (1988).
127
Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160
(1999).
128
Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 445.
129
Id. at 496 (“That damages in copyright cases are sometimes difficult to prove may have been the
initial impetus for creating a general statutory damages provision in U.S. copyright law.”); R. Collin
Kilgore, Sneering at the Law: An Argument for Punitive Damages in Copyright, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 637, 652-53 (2013) (noting that actual damages in copyright cases are often difficult and at times
impossible to prove, and the election of statutory damages allows plaintiffs to avoid such difficulties).
130
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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The Problems of U.S. Copyright Statutory Damages Scheme

The statutory damages scheme has been in existence since the
inception of U.S. copyright law and countless efforts have been made to
refine it. However, the scheme does not function as effectively as Congress
intended. Over the years, three major problems have been identified in the
current U.S. copyright statutory damages scheme.
First, statutory damages in certain copyright cases can be “grossly
excessive.”131 This problem can be particularly serious within the peer-topeer (P2P) file sharing context in today’s Internet age. For example, in Sony
BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, five major record labels brought
suit against Joel Tenenbaum, then a twenty-four year-old college graduate,
for illegally uploading thirty songs onto P2P networks like Napster and
Limewire. 132 Eventually, the jury rendered a statutory damages award of
$675,000, with $22,500 for each of the thirty infringed works. In another
similarly notorious case, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, three trials
resulted in awards of $222,000, $1.92 million, and $1.5 million ($9,250,
$80,000, and $62,500 per work, respectively). 133 Such large amounts of
damages become particularly problematic where there is little proof that the
infringement caused any actual harm or the infringer actually profited from
it.134 Within the academic field, there is a fierce debate on whether some of
the statutory damages awards in copyright cases are so excessive that they
actually implicated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 135

131

Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 441.
Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011), aff’d, 719 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013).
133
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp.2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008); Capitol Records
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp.2d 1045, 1049–50 (D. Minn. 2010); Capitol Records, Inc. v. ThomasRasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012).
134
See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 480–90 (listing several examples where excessive
damages were awarded even though it was clear that the infringement caused little actual damages and the
infringer benefited little from the infringement).
135
Compare Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 74, at 491–97 (arguing that some of the statutory
damages in copyright cases might be unconstitutionally excessive under BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996)), with Steven M. Tepp, The Constitutional Challenge to Statutory Damages for Copyright
Infringement: Don’t Gore Section 504, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUP. 93 (2009)
(arguing that BMW v. Gore does not apply to the statutory damages provision of Copyright Act, and the
copyright statutory damages schemes would pass the constitutional muster); see also Pamela Samuelson &
Ben Sheffner, Unconstitutionally Excessive Statutory Damages Awards in Copyright Cases, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 53 (2009) (transcribing the debate between Professor Samuelson and Mr. Sheffner,
NBC Universal Inc.’s copyright attorney regarding the constitutionality of statutory damages provision in
U.S. copyright law).
132
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Second, large awards of statutory damages leads to problematic
enforcement tactics that abuse the copyright system. While the problem of
patent trolls has been recognized for some time, the problem of copyright
trolls is on the rise in recent years. 136 It is reported that some litigious
copyright holders would file hundreds, if not thousands, of lawsuits against
tens of thousands of anonymous Internet users.137 These cases rarely end up
in trial; instead, the copyright trolls would file “boilerplate complaints based
on a modicum of evidence calculated to maximize settlement profits by
minimizing costs and profits.”138 Commentators and industry shareholders
both pointed out that statutory damages play a major role in facilitating such
abusive litigious behavior.139
Ironically, the third problem associated with U.S. copyright law’s
current statutory damages scheme is its utter ineffectiveness in deterring
copyright infringement despite the regularity of excessive damages
awards. 140 In the context of a content consuming industry, a copyright
owner often elects to sue intermediaries for secondary infringement instead
of suing individual end-consumers for cost-effectiveness reasons. 141
However, statutory damages awarded against these intermediaries for
secondary infringement rarely incentivize the direct infringers to stop the

136

Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1111–19 (2015);
James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age
of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 91 (2012).
137
Interestingly, the most active “copyright trolls” in the U.S. appeared to be adult movie studios. In
was reported that the most litigious studio, Malibu Media (X-Art) filed over 4500 copyright infringement
cases in less than 4 years. See Andy, New York Judge Puts Break on Copyright Troll Subpoenas,
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 7, 2015), https://torrentfreak.com/new-york-judge-puts-brakes-on-copyright-trollsubpoenas-151007/.
138
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND
STATUTORY DAMAGES 74 (2016), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/copyrightwhitepaper.pdf
[hereinafter COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WHITE PAPER]; see also EFF Calls For Court Sanctions For Copyright Troll’s
Public Humiliation Tactic, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cases/malibu-media (last visited Feb. 29, 2016)
(describing Malibu Media’s tactic of filing long lists of adult movie titles on the public record, accusing an Internet user of
illegally downloading those movies, and “humiliating” these Internet users to settle).
139
Sag, supra note 136, at 1121–27, 1135 (pointing out the statutory damages and joinder rules play
major roles in leading to abusive litigation behaviors of copyright trolls, and advocating reforming the
statutory damages scheme in U.S. copyright law); DeBriyn, supra note 136, at 106–09 (noting that the
existence of statutory damages is the prerequisite of current copyright troll problem and advocating
removing the statutory damages provision all together).
140
Kilgore, supra note 129, at 657-58; see also Anna Cronk, The Punishment Doesn’t Fit the Crime –
Why and How Congress Should Revise the Statutory Copyright Damages Provision for Noncommercial
Infringements on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Networks, 39 SW. L. REV. 181 (2009).
141
Berg, supra note 113, at 310 (“Suing intermediaries may be cost-effective for the content
industries because in a single lawsuit they can eliminate a mechanism that a large number of end-users are
using to infringe . . . ”).
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infringement.142 On the contrary, when these legitimate intermediaries are
consequently forced out of the market en masse, the end-consumers often
turn to underground markets. 143 This in turn decreases compliance with the
law and further aggravates infringement. 144
A more concerning
effectiveness problem with the statutory damages scheme is that it often hits
the small players hard, but spares the truly egregious infringers. For
example, in the Thomas case, the defendant, a single mother, was ordered to
pay statutory damages of nearly a $250,000 dollars for twenty-four music
works she uploaded onto Kazza.com. 145 Even the courts admitted that the
defendant, who “acted like countless other Internet users,” was simply
seeking access to free music and not trying to make any profits through her
infringement. 146 In contrast, when an egregious infringer’s profits
significantly exceed the maximum statutory damages available, the
defendant may refuse to appear in court and force the court to resort to
statutory damages in a default judgment. 147 This is essentially the same
difficulty a patent owner in China faces in obtaining damages.148
C.

Lessons for Chinese Patent Law’s Statutory Damages Scheme

At first glance, the problems associated with the statutory damages
schemes in Chinese patent law and U.S. copyright law are polar opposite:
inadequate damages for Chinese patent law and excessive damages in U.S.
copyright law. However, these two problems are merely different symptoms
rooted in the same disease: the inherent arbitrariness of the statutory
damages approach.
Because statutory damages are fundamentally
“untethered from anything,” there is no meaningful reform available to fix it
without essentially abandoning the statutory damages approach. 149 If the
142

Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without
Reducing Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1350-51 (2004).
143
Berg, supra note 113, at 313; see also Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 266 (2005).
144
Berg, supra note 113, at 313 (noting that, in the context of P2P, the empirical evidence has shown
that shutting down various P2P file-sharing networks has actually led to an increase in direct infringement
instead of a decrease).
145
Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008).
146
Id. at 1227.
147
Kilgore, supra note 129, at 657–58 (noting that in Venegas-Hernandez v. Sonolus Records, 370
F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2004), the defendant intentionally refused to appear in court, which was likely a
deliberate tactic to force the court to resort to statutory damages in avoiding the likely larger damages based
on its profits).
148
As discussed above, a patent infringer in China would simply refuse to cooperate in supplying
necessary evidence to assist plaintiff in calculating the actual damages or infringer’s profits, which in turn
forces the court to resort to the statutory damages approach.
149
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT WHITE PAPER, supra note 138, at 73.
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purpose of awarding statutory damages is supposed to be compensatory, the
statutory damages awarded are not tied to the amount of harm caused. Nor
are these damages tied to the amount of unjust profits made by an infringer,
or any realistic assessment of what an appropriate deterrence would be, to
fulfil any sense of punitive purpose. Consequently, even though the U.S.
has attempted to inject nuances into its copyright law’s statutory damages
scheme for many years, there are simply no guiding principles for courts to
apply in determining a proper level of damages other than keeping it within
the statutory range.
Moreover, the problems associated with the statutory damages scheme
in current U.S. copyright law are indicative of what Chinese patent law will
likely face in the future. As discussed above, due to its rigidity, whether
statutory damages can effectively compensate an injured patent owner
depends, in part, on what level of compensation the policy maker provides in
the first place.150 As policy makers in China gradually increase the upperand lower limits of the statutory ranges of patent damages, it is a possibility
that the policy makers will over-correct the problem by setting a
compensation level too high. This may lead to the systematic abuse problem
prevalent in today’s U.S. copyright system. 151 The recent proposal for the
Fourth Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law already points to some early
signs of over-correction, as it proposes significantly increase the minimum
statutory damages by ten-fold, from RMB 10,000 to 100,000, and to increase
the maximum statutory damages by five-fold, from RMB 1,000,000 to RMB
5,000,000.152
Finally, as demonstrated by the U.S. copyright law experience,
because there is essentially no underlying principle to be applied
consistently across the cases, statutory damages punish some infringers by
overcompensating the right holders while leaving other right holders
undercompensated, no matter what the statutory range the policy makers set
150

See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 136–139.
152
The recent draft for the Fourth Amendment to Chinese Patent Law proposed to significantly
increase the minimum statutory damages by ten-fold, from RMB 10,000 to 100,000, and to increase the
maximum statutory damages by five-fold, from RMB 1,000,000 to RMB 5,000,000. See LEGISLATIVE
AFFAIRS OFFICE OF THE ST. COUNCIL P.R. CHINA, supra note 96. Curiously, this draft also proposed to add
a specific “punitive damages” provision, which allow a court to award up to three times the damages
assessed based on patentee’s loss approach, infringer’s profits approach or reasonable royalty approach. Id.
This new provision appears to further the confusion on what purpose the statutory damages provision
actually serves in the overall damages calculation scheme by instituting two punitive damages provisions
within one article. See text accompanying supra notes 29–30.
151
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it to be. 153 The statutory damages scheme in the Chinese patent law is
unlikely to avoid this dilemma given all the confusion regarding what
purpose the statutory damages provision actually serves. 154 Accordingly, we
argue that any attempt to further amend the current statutory damages
provision in Chinese patent law would likely be counterproductive as it will
lead to other equally troubling problems.
V.

BUILDING A ROBUST DAMAGES CALCULATION SCHEME FOR CHINESE
PATENT LAW WITHOUT THE STATUTORY DAMAGES PROVISION: U.S.
AND GERMAN PATENT LAW EXPERIENCE

Admittedly, eliminating the statutory damages scheme from Chinese
patent law is not without risk. As discussed before, the impetus for the
People’s Supreme Court to adopt a statutory damage “exception” in 2001
was the difficulty to prove damages through the three formal approaches—
(1) patentee’s losses, (2) infringer’s profits, and (3) reasonable royalty. 155
Arguably, a patent system without the statutory damages scheme in today’s
China may still leave the patent owners where they started back in 2001:
unable to obtain any damages at all. However, we argue that the policy
makers in China need to adopt a forward-looking attitude when solving the
current under-compensation problem in the patent system. Instead of
shortcutting the damages determination with a statutory damages provision,
more attention needs to be given to improving the effectiveness and
efficiency of the other three approaches.156 In other words, eliminating the
statutory damages provision is merely the first step in a more comprehensive
reform. If the U.S. copyright law experience demonstrates the futility of
reforming the Chinese patent law’s statutory damage scheme, the U.S. and
German patent law experience illustrates the feasibility for China to develop
a robust damages calculation scheme without a statutory damages scheme.157

153

See text accompanying supra notes 140–148.
See text accompanying supra notes 29–30 (illustrating the confusion on whether the statutory
damages in Chinese patent law are compensatory in nature or punitive in nature).
155
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
156
See Liu, supra note 36 (the Director of the Third Tribunal of the Supreme People’s Court
remarked that the low compensation problem in China’s patent system cannot be solved by simply
increasing the statutory damages ranges, and that developing the discovery mechanism is the key to
fundamentally solve the problem).
157
The Authors adopted the United States and Germany as examples for two reasons: (1) both
countries have robust and effective patent protection system; (2) both countries have huge influences on the
development of Chinese patent system.
154
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Damages Award in the United States Patent Law

On the substantive front, the current U.S. patent law prescribes two
types of compensatory damages for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §
284.158 First, if the patent owner and the infringer are competitors in the
same market, the patent owner may state a claim for its own lost profits in
the form of sales diversion, price erosion, or increased expense.159 Second,
if the patent owner and the infringer are not competitors, or the patent owner
cannot establish lost profits with sufficient evidence, the patent owner can
claim an established or hypothetical royalty. 160 A reasonable royalty based
on hypothetical negotiation acts as the floor of a potential damages
recovery. 161 A damage award can include both lost profits and reasonable
royalty.162
To claim lost profits, a patent owner must show that “but for” the
infringement it would have earned the profits it alleges it lost, and the loss of
those profits was reasonably foreseeable consequence of the infringement. 163
One way to establish this “but-for” causation is to demonstrate the four
Panduit factors: (1) a demand for the patented product, (2) an absence of
acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) the patent holder had
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the
amount of profit the patent owner would have made. 164 However the
Panduit standard is not the exclusive standard used to establish but-for
causation.165 If the subject patent only covers one component of a multicomponent product, the patent owner may only recover the lost profits
corresponding to the portion.166 However, if a patent owner proves that the
The relevant statute reads: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2011)
159
7-20 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.03, Part 1 of 3 (Mathew Bender ed. 2016);
see also Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[D]amages may include lost profits
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246 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the minimum damage a patent owner may recovery is the
reasonable royalty).
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“patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand,” he may be
rewarded based on the value of the total product without any apportionment
of value between the patented and unpatented features.167 This is commonly
referred as the “Entire Market Value Rule.” 168
On the other hand, a patent owner may claim a reasonable royalty,
which is “what a willing licensor and licensee would bargain for during
hypothetical negotiations on the date the infringement started.” 169 This
reasonable royalty is typically calculated by multiplying a royalty rate by a
royalty base. 170 A court typically considers the fifteen George-Pacific
factors to determine the royalty rate.171 The royalty base should generally be
based on the “smallest salable patent-practicing unit.”172 The Entire Market
Value Rule similarly applies to the reasonable royalty context as well. 173
On the procedural front, the amount of damages suffered by a patentee
as a result of infringement is an issue of fact that is determined by either a
jury or the court.174 The court has the discretion to bifurcate the damages
determination phase and the liability phase. 175 However, bifurcation of the
liability phase and damages phase in the U.S. context tends to result in
considerable delay and extra costs because (1) the parties need to separate
discovery pertaining to damages issues, and (2) sometimes a new jury needs
to be assembled.176 Typically, each party will present a damages expert to
explain how the fact-finder (jury or court) should calculate damages and to
testify on a variety of factors underlying the determination of lost profits or a
reasonable royalty. 177 Other fact witnesses, including the inventor and
corporate officers, will have to testify on many of these subjects throughout
the trial. 178 It is also noteworthy that the United States has the most
extensive, and probably cumbersome, discovery mechanism, which typically

167
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is the primary driver for litigation expenses.179 It is widely recognized that
the uneven discovery burden between a patentee and an infringer is the
primary driver for the “patent troll” problem in the United States.180
Finally, 35 U.S.C. § 284 also allows a court to exercise its discretion
to “increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.” 181
The relating case law mandates that such treble damages are appropriate
only if the court finds the infringement to be “willful.” 182 The exact standard
for determining “willfulness” is in flux pending Supreme Court review. 183
However, it is generally undisputed that treble damages are a punitive
damages provision in U.S. patent law. 184
B.

Damages Award in German Patent Law

Unlike its U.S. counterpart, patent law in Germany provides no
punitive damages. 185 Nonetheless, the compensatory damages must be
“sufficiently high to provide a deterrent effect.”186 On the substantive front,

179

Id. at 193–253; see also John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547 (2010).
180
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TECH. L.J. 10, 12 (2014); J. Jason Williams, Mark V. Campagna, & Oliva E. Marbutt, Strategies for
Combatting Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 368 (2010); Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform and
Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 179, 196–99 (2015).
181
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
182
See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488 (1853) (suggesting that a discretionary increase in
damages under the 1836 Act should be reserved only for “the wanton and malicious pirate”); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 663, 674 (7th Cir. 1960) (holding that increased
damages are for “conscious and wilful [sic] infringer”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964) (noting that increased damages are only available “in a case of willful or badfaith infringement”).
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Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 774 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014), withdrawn and replaced by
Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (Oct. 19, 2015)
(the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the current willfulness standard need to changed).
184
See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008) (listing Section 284 among
punitive damages statutes); Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 196 (1881) (“[T]he Patent Act of 1836 . . .
leav[es] it to the discretion of the court to inflict punitive damages to the extent of trebling the verdict.”);
SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“When willful
infringement or bad faith has been found, the remedy of enhancement of damages not only serve its
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there are three methods available to calculate actual damages: (1) patentee’s
lost profits, (2) infringer’s profits, and (3) reasonable royalty. 187
For the patentee’s lost profits approach, the patentee generally bears
the burden to prove the extent of its lost profits. 188 Similar to U.S. law, the
patentee in Germany must also prove that it indeed lost profits due to the
infringement, which is akin to the “but for” causation in U.S. patent law. 189
This causation, in turn, requires the patentee to prove that he actually used
the patent directly, and that there is at least a probability that he would
realize the lost profits.190 This is typically very challenging for patentees to
prove unless the market is well-developed and well-defined.191 Further, a
patentee seeking damages under this method is also required to disclose its
own detailed price calculation, which goes against the will of many
companies.192 As a result, this “lost profits” approach is rarely used in real
practice.193
For the infringer’s profits, damages are calculated by subtracting the
“costs of the business” from the infringer’s net revenue. 194 The patentee
typically needs to determine the infringer’s net revenue and costs through a
“rendering of accounts” proceeding.195 Similarly to U.S. law, the court must
consider what portion of the profits can be effectively attributed to the
infringement, and the damages should be adjusted accordingly. 196 This
method is substantially easier than the patentee’s lost profits approach, and
approximately 75% of patent damages calculations adopt this approach.197
Where the patentee’s lost profits and infringer’s profits do not justify
a sufficient damages award, the reasonable royalty approach provides a
baseline measurement.198 The doctrinal premise underpinning this approach
187

Id.; see also JOHANN PITZ, ATSUSHI KAWADA & JEFFREY A. SCHWAB, PATENT LITIGATION IN
GERMANY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES, 52–54 (2015).
188
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53.
189
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53.
190
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191
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HARGUTH & C ARLSON, supra note 185, at 217; PITZ, KAWADA & SCHWAB, supra note 187, at 53.
198
HARGUTH & C ARLSON, supra note 185, at 214.
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is the principle that an unauthorized user should not be better off compared
to a user who legally obtained a license. 199 Similar to the U.S. law, this
approach is premised on a hypothetical license that both parties would have
agreed upon at the time of the infringement. 200 The framework of
determining a reasonable royalty is essentially the same with U.S. law: the
royalty base times the royalty rate.201 Typically, the royalty base is the net
revenue made by the infringing products.202 However, where the patent only
covers one of many different components or features of a product, concepts
comparable to “apportionment” and the “smallest salable patent practicing
unit” also exist in German patent law. 203 As to the royalty rate, a court
typically looks into existing license agreements in the market and the
customary industry practice as a starting point.204 Then, the court will adjust
this starting rate based on a collection of factors, such as the technological
and economic importance of the invention, interaction between the royalty
base and the amount of the rate, volume of sales, the risks a normal licensee
bear that an infringer may avoid, and marketing efforts or business
connections that drove the sales.205
On the procedural front, there is no jury for any part of the trial. The
determination of liability is completely bifurcated from the damages
determination in German patent law. 206 After the liability proceeding, or the
“first stage” proceeding, if the court finds the infringer liable for
infringement, the patentee must post a bond and may demand the infringer to
“render an accounting.” 207 During this process, the infringer is under the
obligation to render the patentee an account of all substantial facts necessary
for the calculation of patentee’s damages, including the quantity of the
infringing products, the sales price of infringing products, dates of delivery,
customer lists, and a calculation of production costs. 208 The accounting
199

Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 21, 2012, X ZR 36/80, [GRUR] 1982,
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200
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201
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202
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203
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Justice] Mar. 14, 2000, X ZR 8/90, [GRUR] 1992, 599 (“Teleskopzylinder”); Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf
OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court] July 17, 2009, 2 U 38/08, Beck RS 2010, 21821 “Kappaggregat.”
204
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205
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rendered must be sufficiently specific to allow the patentee to calculate its
losses. 209 In most cases, the parties resolve the damages amount out of
court.210 If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the patentee must file a
separate lawsuit, the “second stage” proceeding, to request a court to
determine the damages. 211 Once a damages proceeding is initiated, the
patentee may elect to pursue damages under any one of the three calculation
methods.212 Further, the patentee may freely change from one method to
another until the court enters a final judgement on the damages amount.213
C.

Lessons for Chinese Patent Law

Patent law presents a level of complexity and difficulty that typically
demands extraordinary attention to legal nuance. 214
Damages
determinations in patent cases are no exception. The U.S. and German
experiences are particularly illuminating when determining how China can
build a robust patent damages regime without the statutory damages
provision.
On the substantive front, both U.S. and German patent law illustrate
the necessity of developing a body of relevant laws to deal with the
complexity of patent cases. For example, as demonstrated by the German
experience, the difficulty of proving actual losses is not a problem unique to
China’s patent system. 215 However, the infringer’s profits approach has
great potential to fill in the void if some basic discovery mechanism is
established and strengthened. 216 As argued by countless scholars, China
may as well look into the numerous well-established doctrinal principles in
U.S. and German patent law, such as the price erosion theory, the entire
market value rule, but-for causation, and the direct competition test, to speed
up the development of its patent damages laws. 217 Further, China needs to
substantially expand the reasonable royalty approach by relaxing the
209
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requirement for an existing license.218 Both the U.S. and German experience
demonstrate that this reasonable royalty approach can be extraordinarily
adaptable to handle complex cases involving advanced technologies.219
On the procedural front, German patent law provides more insightful
lessons as its judicial system is relatively close to the Chinese system. 220
Specifically, it is unthinkable how China can advance its patent system
without strengthening its discovery mechanism. Admittedly, a discovery
mechanism as elaborate as the U.S.’s system might not be entirely
desirable.221 However, a procedure akin to the “rendering an accounting”
process in German patent law is desperately needed in the current Chinese
system. Encouragingly, the policy makers in China appear to be taking
some positive steps on this front in the past year. 222 Further, the current
Chinese patent statute instructs courts to apply the four approaches in a
sequential order to determine damages. 223 It is unclear why this is necessary.
Nor is it clear whether courts actually follow this instruction.224 Instead of
letting a court dictate the agenda, policy makers in China should allow a
patentee to freely choose the calculation approaches that he deems
appropriate (either because it authorizes the highest damages award or it has
the most sufficient evidentiary backing). Finally, bifurcating the liability
phase and damages determination phase may be another plausible
218
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adjustment that is worth considering. For one thing, it sets up a procedural
hurdle to encourage the parties to settle the matter out of the court. 225
Moreover, it might alleviate the time pressure put on a court to adjudicate
both liability and damages in a single proceeding.
CONCLUSION
At one time, the statutory damages provision might have served a
worthy purpose in the Chinese patent system. That time has clearly come to
an end. It is nearly impossible to find any doctrinal justification for the
existence of Chinese patent law’s statutory damages provision. On a
practical level, not only do statutory damages drive the overall damages in
patent cases down to an unjustifiable level, but such damages are also
fundamentally detrimental to the legitimacy of the entire patent system of
China. The current policy discussion on adjusting the statutory range
distracts policy makers from the root of the problem and hinders the
development of real solutions. 226 Instead of holding on to this Band-Aid
style fix, Chinese policy makers are better off without it.
The encouraging side of the story is that, if the statutory damages
provision is eliminated, the shareholders of Chinese patent system have
demonstrated the potential to advance the reforms proposed in this Article.
On one hand, the cases like Qihoo 360 Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Sogou Info. Serv.
Co., Ltd. demonstrate Chinese jurists’ capability to render a fair and nuanced
determination in a case that involved complex technologies without resorting
to the statutory damages approach.227 On the other, the Supreme People’s
Court has illustrated its ability and willingness to take a leadership role in
developing the body of law through judicial interpretation and guiding
cases.228 These developments indicate the great potential for China to build
225
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a better, stronger, and more efficient patent protection regime without the
statutory damages provision.
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